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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The impact of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) on Victorian guardianship practice
Joanne Watsona, Julie Andersona, Erin Wilsonb and Kate L. Andersona
aSchool of Health and Social Development, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia; bFaculty of Business and Law, Swinburne University,
Hawthorn, VIC, Australia
ABSTRACT
Purpose: Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
emphasises full and equal legal capacity of all citizens to participate in decisions. This paper examines
whether the principles of Article 12, also reflected in other reform documents, were evident within 12
guardianship hearings conducted in Victoria, Australia from 2001 to 2016 involving adults with cognitive
disability. The issues this study raises resonate loudly across the globe as multiple signatory nations to
the CRPD grapple with the complexities of implementing Article 12.
Methods: Reports of VCAT decisions with written reasons of Guardianship List hearings from 2001 to
2016 were selected from the Australasian Legal Information Institute site and analysed thematically.
Results: Thematic analysis of proceedings revealed three consistent trends. Firstly, a presumption of
incapacity based on disability excluded Proposed Represented Persons (PRP) from involvement in deci-
sion-making. Secondly, external perceptions of PRPs best interest were dominated by safeguarding con-
cerns and conflict between supporters. Finally, in multiple cases, although a PRP’s preference had been
established, it was considered immaterial to the final decision.
Conclusions: The paper concludes with a promising discussion of the new Guardianship and
Administration Act 2019 (Vic), which came into force on 1 March 2020, and recommendations for guard-
ianship practice both locally and internationally.
 IMPLICATIONS FOR REHABILITATION
 Legal capacity should be recognised as inherent in all people, and therefore decision making incap-
acity should not be assumed based on a person’s cognitive and/or communication disability;
 The supported decision making mechanisms, born from Article 12 of the CRPD, that facilitate
acknowledgment, interpretation and acting upon a person’s expression of will and preference need
to be recognised and promoted within the context of Guardianship proceedings and by health pro-
fessionals when assessing decision making capacity of people with cognitive disability;
 Significant knowledge and attitudinal changes are required within the Tribunal and incorporated into
the practice of health professionals informing the Tribunal, in order to counter many conceptual
underpinnings embedded within current guardianship legislation across the globe;
 Ascertaining the will and preference of the proposed represented person should be prioritised by
Guardianship tribunal members’ rather than the management of conflict between interested parties.
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The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its Optional
Protocol on 13 December 2006. The CRPD was the first human
rights treaty adopted in the twenty first century, and arguably,
the most rapidly negotiated [1]. The CRPD embodies a paradigm
shift away from a social welfare response to disability to one that
is firmly entrenched in human rights. Article 12 of the Convention
arguably provides the strongest example of this paradigm shift
[2]. Article 12 requires signatory nations to recognise that legal
capacity is a universal construct, and that people with disability
enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others. Additionally, it
mandates signatory nations to develop appropriate mechanisms
to support individuals to exercise this legal capacity. The
Convention promotes supported decision-making (in lieu of sub-
stituted decision-making) as one such mechanism.
In Australia, as in most countries around the world, people
with significant cognitive impairment are routinely subjected to
substitute decision-making mechanisms. This is despite Australia’s
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, in particular Article 12 [3]. Engaging with this context,
marked by several policy and legislation changes, this study
sought to explore the effect of this discursive shift on the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) between 2001
and 2016. In this paper, the authors outline this study’s findings.
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Although coming from an Australian perspective, these findings
contribute to a global conversation about the role of Article 12 of
the CRPD in the lives of people with cognitive disability and in
the administrative systems designed to support them.
Guardianship, self-determination and article 12 of the CRPD
Concepts relating to self-determination have played a promin-
ent role in the discourse of human rights since 1948, when the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrined the concept
into international human rights law [4]. The disability rights
movement of the 1970s further developed the focus on self-
determination for people with disability [5]. However, despite
gains for those with physical and milder cognitive disability,
opportunities for self-determination were, and continue to be,
restricted for people with more severe cognitive disability [6].
The literature points to several reasons for this restriction,
including a lack of opportunity for choice [7], a view that a
person’s ability to make and communicate decisions is solely
dependent on cognitive functioning, [8], negative attitudes
toward disability [9], and a lack of responsiveness to expres-
sions of will and preference [10,11]. As a result, people with
cognitive disability are often viewed as requiring the appoint-
ment of formal (State-appointed) or informal substitute deci-
sion-makers, usually in the form of family members or paid
advocates. These substitute decision-makers are given the legis-
lative power to act on behalf of the person concerned, gener-
ally using a best interest framework, where a determination is
made through the application of an objective assessment of
the “best interests” of the person concerned.
However, both substitute decision-making and its attendant
“best interest” process are challenged by Article 12 of the United
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [2].
The United Nations’ General Assembly adopted the CRPD in
December 2006 and it was entered into force in May 2008. Article
12 requires signatory nations to rethink domestic laws, offering
new ways of thinking about capacity, recognising that “persons
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others
in all aspects of life” [2]. From this premise, Article 12 stipulates
the universal right of all humans to receive appropriate support
to make decisions. This support, referred to as “supported deci-
sion-making” has emerged as an alternative paradigm, support
practice and, in some jurisdictions, legal structure (e.g., Peru), to
be implemented instead of substitute decision-making. This is
consistent with signatory nations’ obligations under Article 12 of
the CRPD [12,13].
Article 12 presents a clear challenge to existing systems of
guardianship for people with cognitive disability. Multiple juris-
dictions, amongst them, Australia1, Canada, Egypt, Estonia,
Georgia, Kuwait, Netherlands, Norway, and the Arab Republic of
Syria, have responded to this challenge by retaining interpret-
ative declarations and reservations relating to Article 12. The
wording of these declarations and reservations are relatively
consistent across these jurisdictions and, as pointed out by
Cavaino [14], appear to demonstrate that the States holding
them believe that their domestic laws are incompatible with
Article 12. Cavaino’s assertion is reflected in Estonia’s declar-
ation, which states:
The Republic of Estonia interprets article 12 of the Convention as it
does not forbid to restrict a person’s active legal capacity, when such
need arises from the person’s ability to understand and direct his or
her actions. In restricting the rights of the persons with restricted active
legal capacity the Republic of Estonia acts according to its domestic
laws [15].
Such an interpretative declaration enables the nation declaring
it, to retain laws that use substituted decision-making where a
person is deemed by the State to have limited decision-making
capacity. Referring to such declarations, McSherry [16] claims that
while a nation does not recognise the universality of Article 12
(that is, that it applies to all people regardless of level or type of
disability), it is not acting within the spirit of the Convention.
Reinforcing this view, in its review of Australia’s progress in 2013,
the United Nations monitoring body for the CRPD, the Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, articulated that it was:
… concerned about the possibility that the regime of substitute
decision-making will be maintained and that there is still no detailed
and viable framework for supported decision-making in the exercise of
legal capacity. The Committee recommends that the State party
[Australia] effectively use the current inquiry [by the Australian Law
Reform Commission] to take immediate steps to replace substitute
decision-making with supported decision-making and that it provide a
wide range of measures which respect a person’s autonomy, will and
preferences and are in full conformity with article 12 of the
Convention… [17]
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
has reiterated its concerns in its recent consideration of the com-
bined second and third periodic reports of Australia at its 499th
and 500th meetings, held on 12 and 13 September 2019 [18]. The
Committee stated specific concerns around “… the lack of pro-
gress to review and withdraw the interpretive declarations on
articles 12, 17 and 18 [and recommends Australia] Review and
withdraw the Interpretative Declarations on articles 12, 17 and 18
of the Convention” [18]. The Committee’s concerns relating to
declarations and reservations relating to Article 12 are not only
focused on Australia, but all jurisdictions that have similar declara-
tions and reservations in place. This concern is not only exempli-
fied in the Committee’s recent response to Australia but in the
explicit commendation it gave to Great Britain and Northern
Ireland for that State’s withdrawal of its reservation to article 12
(4) of the Convention in 2017 [19].
The evolution of guardianship practice in Victoria
Victoria is a one of six states and two territories that comprise the
Australian federated system. Each State and Territory has the
authority to determine its own legislation in relation to legal cap-
acity and decision-making. Although Victoria has been adopted as
the focus for this study, the findings have clear application to sig-
natory nations to the CRPD, that continue to implement substi-
tute decision-making for people with cognitive disability through
mechanisms such as guardianship.
The Parliament of Victoria enacted the Guardianship and
Administration Act 1986 (Vic) in 1986 [20]. This legislation consid-
ered ground breaking for the time, was introduced to allow for
the appointment of a substitute decision-maker to make personal,
medical, and financial decisions for people deemed to have
impaired decision-making capacity [20]. The introduction of this
law occurred against a backdrop of increasing deinstitutionalisa-
tion for people with intellectual disability, as well as a growing
international movement towards recognising human rights for
people with disability.
Since its promulgation, a number of amendments have been
made to the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 [20].
These included an amendment to Section 22 in 2006 to include a
requirement to consider the wishes of the proposed represented
person, as far as they could be ascertained, when determining if a
guardian was needed [21]. It is not clear if this amendment was
made in response to the development of human rights
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instruments such as the CRPD, however, it does reflect an attempt
to include the proposed represented person (PRP) in the guard-
ianship process to a greater extent.
In 2012, the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) released
its final report of its review of Victoria’s guardianship laws along
with its recommendations for new laws that reflected
“contemporary thinking about people with impaired decision-
making ability and which are designed for the many different
groups of people who now use these laws” [22]. The report rec-
ommended that, “A new single statute should be created to pro-
vide for supported decision-making and substitute decision-
making for people with impaired decision-making ability” [22]. In
2014, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) released its
report: Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
[23]. In this report, the ALRC introduced the idea of positions of
“supporter” and “representative” to assist people who need deci-
sion-making support.
Recommendations from both the VLRC [22] and ALRC [23]
reports are reflected in the recent Guardianship and
Administration Act 2019 (Vic) [24], which came into effect 1
March 2020. Replacing the 1986 Act, the new Act introduces a
new category of guardianship whereby the VCAT member can
appoint a supportive guardian for personal matters or supportive
administrator for financial matters.
Materials and methods
This paper describes a research project situated within the
Australian jurisdiction of Victoria. This project was designed to
examine if, and if so how, the discourses and considerations
expressed in guardianship reform and policy are reflected within
guardianship hearings of VCAT over a 15-year period, 2001–2016.
This time period was chosen as it covered the multiple legislative
and policy changes in guardianship practice within Victoria over
the past 20 years.
The research was guided by the following research questions:
1. What are the key drivers to decisions made by VCAT regard-
ing guardianship for people with severe cognitive disability
between 2001 and 2016?
2. How have the key drivers to decisions made by VCAT
evolved over this period?
3. To what extent is a person’s will and preference responded
to (acknowledged, interpreted and acted on) in the process
of guardianship hearings over this period?
Sample
Reports of VCAT decisions with written reasons of Guardianship
List hearings from 2001 to 2016 are publicly available through the
Australasian Legal Information Institute site [25]. It is important to
note that while all parties to Guardianship cases at VCAT are pro-
vided with reasons for final decisions, not all decisions are pub-
lished in writing. The second author read all of the published
proceedings from 2001 to 2016 to identify guardianship proceed-
ings that fit the selection criteria.
Cases were selected if they were heard between 2001 and
2016 (inclusive) and involved people with severe cognitive disabil-
ity. For the purpose of this study, a person with severe cognitive
disability was defined as someone with significant cognitive
impairment as a result of a lifelong intellectual impairment or an
acquired cognitive impairment such as dementia or traumatic
brain injury. A person with severe cognitive disability is likely to
have difficulty using and understanding formal or symbolic lan-
guage (synonymous with “informal communicators”) and is fre-
quently considered to have limited decision-making capacity [26].
Twelve cases were identified, five prior to the amendments to the
Guardianship and Administration Act in 2006 and the drafting of
the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act
(2006) in the same year. In all but one case2 the proposed repre-
sented persons (PRPs) were given unique identifiers by VCAT to
protect their identities. Demographic information about the PRPs,
including whether their disability was lifelong or acquired can be
found in Table 1. The hearings were related to both new applica-
tions for guardianship and the continuation of current guardian-
ship arrangements.
Analysis
Consistent with an interpretative research methodology, the tran-
scripts of the proceedings of the selected Guardianship List cases
were treated as “texts”. These are meaningful phenomena that,
because they are coherent, communicative and cohesive, enable
analysis of their inherent themes to reveal social practice [33].
Transcripts were imported into NVivo before being coded and
thematically analysed. Authors 1 and 2 independently coded
emerging themes from the data before comparing and develop-
ing a coding framework. Authors 1 and 2 then independently
applied this coding framework to the data set. They then collab-
oratively reviewed and organised these codes into basic themes
Table 1. Demographic information from VCAT cases.
VCAT Case no. Year Sex Age group Disability type
VCAT 12 [27] 2002 F 50–59 Lifelong cognitive disability
VCAT 121 [25] 2003 F 60–69 Acquired cognitive disability
VCAT 1880 [28] 2004 M 40–49 Acquired cognitive disability
VCAT 779 [24] 2005 F 50–59 Acquired cognitive disability
VCAT 1300 [29] 2007 M 80–89 Acquired cognitive disability
VCAT 2219 [30] 2009 F 80–89 Acquired cognitive disability
VCAT 2430 [23] 2009 F 20–29 Lifelong cognitive disability
VCAT 2442 [31] 2011 M 80–89 Acquired cognitive disability
VCAT 1232 [32] 2012 F 40–49 Lifelong cognitive disability
VCAT 958 [33] 2015 M Not stated Lifelong cognitive disability
VCAT 1150 [26] 2016 M 20–29 Lifelong cognitive disability
VCAT 1259 [34] 2016 M 40–49 Lifelong cognitive disability
Figure 1. Organising themes and sub-themes.
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using thematic network analysis [33]. Thematic network analysis is
a tool that involves the creation of web-like illustrations that serve
to summarize and present the main themes in a data set. Figure
1 is an example of an illustration generated through thematic net-
work analysis for this study. It illustrates how codes for the ori-
ginal organisation of the data were assembled in basic themes,
which were then arranged into three organising themes.
Results
The main organising themes identified were: (1) perceived incap-
acity of the PRP, (2) best interests of the PRP and (3) consider-
ation of will and preference of the PRP. A number of sub-themes
were identified within these three organising themes. The themes
and sub-themes are represented in Figure 1.
Organising theme: perceived incapacity of the proposed
represented person
This theme, constructed from the two sub themes of disability
and communication, relates to judgements about the capacity of
the PRP to participate in the Guardianship hearing process and to
make decisions about his or her life more broadly.
Disability
During the study period (2001–2016) in Victoria, a Guardian could
be appointed if a proposed represented person had a disability
and “[was] unable by reason of that disability to make reasonable
judgments in respect of all or any of the matters relating to her
or his person or circumstances” [20]. The Guardianship and
Administration Act 1986 does not offer any criteria by which to
assess the presence of disability in a PRP. In all 12 cases included
in this study, the presiding Tribunal member was satisfied that
the PRP had a disability. The nature and extent of disability was
largely determined from advice from medical practitioners as illus-
trated by a tribunal member, who stated:
Dr [name omitted] notes that there have been many assess-
ments over the years. Dr [name omitted]’s diagnosis is that YWR
has advanced severe intellectual disability, is non-verbal, unable
to follow simple instructions, and has no insight. The Tribunal
accepts this evidence and finds that YWR has a disability [35]. Not
only was the determination of “disability” made by a third party
such as a medical practitioner, the determination was largely
made without consultation with the PRP. In the 12 cases included
in this study, VCAT members met three of the PRPs in person
and, of these, only one was present at their Guardianship hearing.
In all other cases, Tribunal members relied entirely on reports
from medical professionals for confirmation of the presence of
disability. The three cases in which members sort consultation
from the PRP occurred across the time period of cases examined,
both pre and post the 2006 amendment to the Guardianship and
Administration Act (1986) and Australia’s signing and ratification
of the UNCRPD in 2008. Both these instruments explicitly require
a focus on and engagement with the PRP. This indicates that
VCAT members’ decisions to engage or not to engage with PRP is
unlikely to have been influenced by these key legislative changes.
Communication
In several of the cases included in this study, the perceived inabil-
ity to make decisions was supported by assessments regarding
communication capacity, which were mainly determined by third
parties, predominantly medical practitioners, often in the absence
of the person themselves. The absence of, particularly verbal,
communication was an attribute clearly associated with members’
perception that a person was unable “to make reasonable judge-
ments”. Tribunal members in eight out of twelve cases analysed
for this study commented on this absence, attributing it to limited
decision making capacity, as illustrated in a member’s conclud-
ing comment:
In summary, the report stated that the represented person has
cerebral palsy and some associated conditions which result in the
represented person being unable to make reasonable decisions
about his health care, his general living circumstances or his
financial and legal affairs. Importantly, he has no means of verbal
or digital communication [35]. The four cases in which VCAT
members did not tribute limited decision-making capacity to a
PRP’s communication difficulties occurred across the time period
of cases examined for this study. Therefore, such judgements did
not appear to be influenced by any key legislative and policy
milestones such as the 2006 amendment to the Guardianship and
Administration Act (1986), the 2012 VLRC or 2014 ALRC reports or
Australia’s signing and ratification of the UNCRPD.
Organising theme: best interests of the proposed
represented person
Best interests were explicitly mentioned in eight of the twelve
cases as a justification for the appointment of a guardian or
administrator. This is unsurprising as, in contrast to Victoria’s new
Guardianship and Administration Act (2019), Section 22(3) of the
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) states that the
Tribunal cannot make a Guardianship order “unless it is satisfied
that the order would be in the best interests of the person in
respect of whom the application is made” [20]. It is worth noting
that in one case (in 2009), an application for an administration
order was declined, as it was not judged necessary as the PRP’s
best interests were being met informally [36]. In all the cases
included in the study, VCAT members needed to consider a multi-
tude of factors when deciding what constituted the best interests
of PRP. Within this organising theme, two sub-themes were iden-
tified – safeguarding and conflict.
Safeguarding
The perception that the person currently making decisions on
behalf of the PRP was not meeting his or her best interests was
found in a number of cases. For example, in one case, conflict
between the current guardian and service providers led to allega-
tions that the PRP’s best interests were not being met.
There was evidence from various parties present that YWR was unable
to have access to appropriate services due to issues at home between
USP and service providers. There was also evidence that YWR’s funds
were not being managed in a manner that promoted his best
interests [35].
In several cases, Tribunal members were required to make
decisions about guardianship where there was a possibility that
an appointed guardian might make decisions regarding the with-
drawal of medical treatment or life support on behalf of a PRP. In
one such case, submissions were made opposing current guard-
ianship orders on the grounds that the best interests of the PRP
would not be safeguarded if they were to continue.
His [current] guardian wishes that his medication be withdrawn and he
be sent home to his [name withheld] facility to let nature take its
course. His sisters, father (Administrator) and [name withheld] carers
disagree but the medical staff say that they are bound by the
guardian’s wishes [37].
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Conflict
Conflict played a prominent role in all 12 cases included in the
study. Conflict frequently occurred between family members and
other parties over living arrangements, lifestyle decisions, finances,
medical treatment, and choice of Guardian and Administrator. The
theme of conflict, especially relating to financial matters and liv-
ing arrangements, appeared to be more prominent in cases
where the PRP had an acquired disability, although a number of
families of people with lifelong disability experienced conflict
regarding medical treatment and the choice of guardian. This
theme of conflict is captured in a Tribunal member’s statement:
Numerous allegations have been levied by each against the other with
AA in one camp and BB and CC in the other. The Tribunal files record
large amounts of correspondence and other documentation referring to
or illustrative of the acrimony between them from many people
including the represented person’s children, other family members, 3
different administrators, guardians from the Office of the Public
Advocate, and service providers [38].
Organising theme: consideration of will and preference of the
proposed represented person
The will and preference of the PRP was considered (but not
necessarily given priority) in nine of the 12 cases included in this
study, and this varied across disability types. That is, the will and
preference of a PRP was more likely to be considered if that per-
son had an acquired, rather than lifelong disability. In all six cases
involving people with lifelong disability, the wishes of family
members (even if they were deceased) were sought during pro-
ceedings and given priority over those of the PRP.
Prioritising other peoples’ wishes
Changes to the Guardianship and Administration Act (1986) in
2006 required consideration of (a) the wishes of the proposed rep-
resented person, as far as they can be ascertained; and (b) the
wishes of any nearest relatives or other family members of the pro-
posed represented person [S.22(2)., 21]. This evolution of the Act in
terms of the need to prioritise the PRP’s wishes is reflected in a
Tribunal member’s comment post 2006. “It is clear that the
Tribunal must, if possible, give effect to A’s [PRP] wishes” [39].
However, in most of the cases examined in this study, the wishes
of family members were generally prioritised, and less consideration
given to the wishes of the PRP. This is exemplified in the above-
mentioned Tribunal member’s proceeding comment:
During the hearing, I observed the close relationship between A and B.
I am satisfied that it is the wish of A that B manage her affairs. To
consider A’s wishes as required by s47(2)(a), however, it is not
necessary to adopt or follow them [39].
In the cases where a PRP’s expressed preference was acknowl-
edged, there was no record of in-depth exploration of these pref-
erences, and those wishes were not afforded any particular
weight in the proceedings. A Tribunal member highlights this,
stating: “The Tribunal accepts that DKN [PRP] has a role to play in
the decision-making process but he is not, and cannot be the
‘driver’ or initiator of it” [40].
Acquired vs lifelong disability
The PRP’s wishes were mentioned in all but three of the cases
included in this study. In these three cases, the PRP was reported
to have severe lifelong, rather than acquired, disability. In cases
where a PRP had an acquired disability, the prior wishes and pref-
erences of the person before they acquired their disability were
explored to some degree, as documented below:
It was impossible to ascertain the applicant’s wife’s views about it for
she had lost the ability to communicate, but in conversations with the
applicant and other family members which took place years prior to
the onset of her illness she had said that she would not want her life
prolonged in circumstances like these [41].
I infer that a reasonable person in his current position could conclude
that certain medical treatment should be refused. When I take into
account the evidence given by CFS about RCS’ [PRP with acquired
disability] [previous] statements and values, this inference is
reinforced [41].
Discussion
The overarching aim of this research was to discover the concep-
tual drivers that underpin VCAT members’ decision-making for
this cohort of cases and whether, and if so how, these drivers had
changed between 2001 and 2016. By so doing, the authors aim
to contribute to the growing body of global literature relating to
the implementation of Article 12 within jurisdictions that continue
to implement guardianship [9,12,34,42].
Throughout the examined 15-year period there appears to be
minimal change in the conceptual drivers underpinning guardian-
ship practice in Victoria. This is likely to be due to the absence of
substantive change in Victorian Guardianship and Administration
law during this period. That is, whether or not someone is
appointed a substitute decision maker or not were the only
options available as supported decision-making was not provided
as a legal option. However, it would appear to also reflect min-
imal change in VCAT members’ thinking in relation to the reform
discourses, embodied in the CRPD in 2006, the VLRC report in
2012 and clearly articulated in the principles at the centre of the
previously mentioned ALRC report in 2014 [23]. These principles
include a right to decision-making, recognition of will and prefer-
ence, and the requirement for decision-making support. The VCAT
decisions analysed as part of this research largely do not reflect
these principles as discussed below.
Assumptions of decision-making incapacity trump right to
decision-making
Decision-making incapacity was assumed on the basis of signifi-
cant cognitive and/or communication disability in all 12 cases
analysed in this study. This assumption was evidenced in mem-
bers’ statements such as:
Dr [name omitted] is of the view that YWR is suffering a disability
which leaves him unable to make judgements about his person or
circumstances… YWR has advanced severe intellectual disability, is non-
verbal, unable to follow simple instructions, and has no insight [35].
And
I did not require the represented person to attend the hearing and I
did not visit him at the facility where he lives. Due to the severity of his
cognitive impairment I was satisfied that his wishes could not be
ascertained [43].
Overall, the prevailing and defining driver of Tribunal decisions
to appoint guardianship appeared to be the expected incapacity
of the person based on the diagnosis of cognitive impairment,
particularly where also associated with non-verbal communication.
This driver did not change over time. Members saw the diagnosis
of a person with significant cognitive disability, confirmed by a
medical practitioner, who may or may not know the person well,
as sufficient evidence of decision-making incapacity. This evidence
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appeared to override the necessity of the member to engage
with PRP directly.
Automatic linking of decision-making incapacity to significant
cognitive and/or communication disability is not only evident
within guardianship hearings, but also exists within non-legal con-
texts. Evidence from other settings suggests that this linking of
disability and decision-making incapacity is a driver of behaviour
of many practitioner groups engaged with people with disability,
despite wider discourses such as the CRPD. Watson found that
there are assumptions amongst everyday supporters of people
with severe cognitive disability that those they support are unable
to participate in decisions, due to their cognitive and communica-
tion disabilities [11,26]. Such assumptions exist despite a body of
empirical evidence that people with severe cognitive disability
who communicate informally can, and are supported to, make
decisions in many aspects of their lives through supported deci-
sion-making mechanisms [11,26,44].
Watson [11] found that supporter responsiveness to a person’s
will and preference was most likely when supporters had a posi-
tive view of the decision-making capacity of those they sup-
ported. This emphasis on the importance of positive assumptions
of decision-making and communicative capacity for people with
significant cognitive impairment is increasingly reinforced within
the research literature [30,45]. This body of literature not only
emphasises the importance of a universal assumption of legal
capacity but also raises important questions, and offers solutions,
relating to how best to support all citizens to exercise legal cap-
acity on an equal basis through supported decision-making
approaches [30,32,42].
Despite this evidence, in none of the 12 cases analysed for this
study was consideration given to the ways PRPs were or could be
supported to either communicate their preferences or participate
in decision-making, and this did not change across the time
period examined.
The imperative to manage conflict
The case files of those examined suggest that a major driver of
VCAT member decisions was the management of conflict. In all
cases analysed for this study there was some element of conflict
between members of (informal) circles of support, contributing to
difficulties within the decision-making process. In the analysed
cases, conflict frequently occurred between family members and
other parties over living arrangements, lifestyle decisions, finances,
medical treatment, and choice of Guardian and Administrator.
Although this theme of conflict was prominent across all cases,
the conflict relating to financial matters and living arrangements
was most evident in cases where the PRP had an acquired, as
opposed to a lifelong, disability. This is likely to be the result of a
person with an acquired disability having had the opportunity to
accumulate wealth before the onset of their disability. For people
with lifelong disability, conflict was most likely to be around deci-
sions relating to medical treatment and the choice of guardian,
rather than their finances.
Conflict amongst supporters has been found to increase the
complexities of decision-making support for people with cognitive
disability outside of a legislative context [26,28,45]. In the pres-
ence of conflict, the preferences of the person being supported,
tend to fade into the background, overshadowed by the conflict
between those supporting them. Watson and colleagues identi-
fied two factors important for effective decision-making support
for people with cognitive disability, collaboration between those
supporting the decision maker as well as a lack of conflict
between these same supporters. Specifically, they found that sup-
port circles that were characterised by minimal conflict demon-
strated greater levels of responsiveness to the will and preference
of those they supported [26].
Navigating a path through the conflicting parties to establish
effective and appropriate decision-making supports is a fraught
task. Attending to the principles promoted by the ALRC, which
focus on supporting the role of the PRP in expressing preference
and being supported to participate in decisions, could offer a
new criteria for the arbitration of these disputes: members could
attend to the will and preference of the supported person and
evaluate the level of attention to decision-making supports on
the part of each disputing party. Without this, the PRP is likely to
remain sidelined and silenced by the conflict around them, as
occurred in the cases examined.
Will and preference
While it could be argued, given the prevalent sub-theme of con-
flict that the cases brought before the Tribunal are likely to be
predominantly about conflict, some cases examined clearly articu-
lated the presence of a functioning and benevolent support sys-
tem that appeared to offer at least moments of supported
preference expression or enactment of decisions based on the
PRPs preferences. It is important to note that this support was
most prominent for people with acquired as opposed to lifelong
disability. In this context, support strategies included identifying
that the PRP had a documented or established preference or deci-
sion, usually from a time prior to the onset of the significant cog-
nitive disability. Tribunal members also commented either on the
strategies they themselves had used to ascertain the PRP’s prefer-
ences (such as visiting or conversing with the PRP), or the sup-
ports present in the person’s environment such as family
members or support staff who understood the will and preference
of their family member. This acknowledgment is exemplified in a
member’s comment, “During the hearing, I observed the close
relationship between A and B. I am satisfied that it is the wish of
A that B manage her affairs…” [39]. Such examples offer evi-
dence that it is possible to establish “the wishes of the repre-
sented person”3.
However, despite this and despite the advent of the CRPD and
the overall reform agenda in relation to decision-making, will and
preference of PRPs was not a driver of member decision making,
and failed to be given primacy (or sometimes, even consideration)
in the cases examined across the period of data analysis. Even
where preferences of the PRP had been identified from prior to
the onset of disability, these appeared to be given little weight
and were largely laid aside or discredited. This is further illustrated
by the above member’s statement that while it was necessary to
consider “…A’s wishes as required by s47(2)(a), however, it is not
necessary to adopt or follow them.” [39]. In another case, a PRP’s
wishes were taken into account, but the member noted that they
were not the primary driver of the decision regarding the choice
of guardian: “The Tribunal accepts that DKN has a role to play in
the decision-making process but he is not, and cannot be the
‘driver’ or initiator of it” [40]. In short, though a PRP’s ability to
express will and preference had been established in some cases,
it was considered wholly or substantially immaterial to the deci-
sion to be made. Hence, despite explicit amendment to the
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 Section 22 in 2006, fol-
lowed by further reinforcement of this principle in VLRC and
ALRC documents, no change in behaviour occurred.
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Implications for guardianship practice
This analysis highlights the deeply held assumptions and under-
standings about the decision-making role, rights and capacity of
people with significant cognitive disability within one
Administrative Appeals jurisdiction in Australia. While new legisla-
tion has recently come into force, the new Act [24], in line with
Australia’s interpretive statement on Article 12, maintains the
practice of capacity assessments along with the option of substi-
tute decision-making and is therefore unlikely to change the
approach to this for people with severe cognitive impairment
who may be informal communicators. While the practice of cap-
acity assessment is maintained, people with significant cognitive
impairments are unlikely to qualify for the supportive guardian-
ship and administration orders, as they are unlikely to have deci-
sion making capacity as defined in Section 5 of the new Act [24].
Without attending to the assumptions and practices identified in
this paper, it is likely that the barrier of consent will be read by
VCAT members through the existing cultural lens that has been
shown to have continued unchanged on these dimensions
between 2001 and 2016. It is important to note however, that
this hypothesis is yet to tested, as at the time of writing, there
was no available data regarding how the new Act has impacted
guardianship practice in Victoria.
In this context, significant knowledge and attitudinal changes
are required within the Tribunal and within the practice of health
professionals informing the Tribunal, in order to counter many of
the embedded conceptual underpinnings of the 1986
Guardianship and Administration Act (Vic). This call for knowledge
and attitudinal change is reflected in the literature focused on dis-
ability rights law, specifically relate to Article 12 of the UNCRPD
[11–13,16,30,34,42,45–47]. Although this body of literature is sub-
stantial, the premise at its heart of a universal right to support
with decision-making regardless of cognitive or communication
disability, is yet to be applied widely across the globe. Costa Rica
and Peru are notable exceptions. Both these jurisdictions have
removed all forms of guardianship for people with disabilities
from their legal landscapes. This means that in Peru and Costa
Rica, legal capacity cannot be removed on the basis of intellec-
tual, psychosocial or cognitive disability. Both reforms are recog-
nised by international human rights bodies such as the United
Nations and Humans Rights Watch as good and promising prac-
tice in the implementation of Article 12 of the Convention.
Despite this recognition, there has been little empirical explor-
ation focused on this new legislation’s implementation in Peru or
Costa Rica in terms of practice change.
The research described in this paper has led to a range of spe-
cific policy and practice recommendations offered to ratifying
jurisdictions’ guardianship tribunals across the globe.
 Disassociating cognitive and severe disability from incapacity:
For legal capacity to be recognised as inherent in all people,
the link between the nature (cognitive) and severity of disability
and decision-making incapacity will need to be broken.
 Recognising the breadth of communicative activity for all
individuals and the options available to support and/or inter-
pret communicative acts.
 Identifying existing and required decision-making supports
and engaging these into the Tribunal processes.
 Managing conflict between parties and increasingly privileg-
ing the preferences of the represented person, along with
those who show commitment to utilise strategies to support
their understanding of these and build these into decisions.
Such a response would assist not only VCAT, but all jurisdic-
tions that maintain guardianship, in efforts to move practice away
from paternalistic approaches to decision-making support to cur-
rent legislative frameworks such as the CRPD and the new
Guardianship and Administration Act 2019 (Vic).
Limitations
Although the study spans data from 15 years of operation, the
final sample size is small due to the limited number of published
cases that fit the criteria. Published cases also lack a consistency
of description and often are concise in their detail. It is not pos-
sible to determine if the data set is representative as information
about the criteria used to select cases for publication is not avail-
able. However, across the 12 cases included in this study, there is
a consistent theme of the existence of an underlying set of
embedded practices and understandings. Further research, in this
and other jurisdictions, could shed light on the generalisability of
these findings. Additionally, the researchers are of the view that
attempts should be made to triangulate these findings through
in-depth interviews with Tribunal members.
Conclusion
In 1986 when Victoria’s guardianship and administration legisla-
tion was written, supported decision-making as a theory or prac-
tice was non-existent. The 1986 Guardianship and Administration
Act (Vic) has since provided the legal frame for these decisions
across a period of more than thirty years. In this context, the
advent of the CRPD and the later reports of the Victorian and
Australian Law Reform Commissions represent recent weather
changes that appear to have had little to no effect on the cultural
bedrock of practice in the Victorian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal. The new Guardianship and Administration Act 2019
(Vic), which came into force March 1, 2020, embeds elements of
Article 12 and understandings of supported decision-making into
legal reform particularly in relation to those with severe cognitive
disability. Proponents of the CRPD warmly welcome this new Act.
However, for the decision-making rights of people with severe
cognitive disability to be upheld, support should be given to
guardianship tribunal members, and those who inform them (e.g.,
health professionals) to increase their understanding of the com-
plexities of Article 12 of the CRPD, particularly the practice of sup-
ported decision-making. In this way, consistent with the paradigm
shift instigated by Article 12 of the CRPD, the human right to
legal capacity of all signatory nations’ citizens, including people
with the most significant cognitive disability is likely to be seen as
a priority.
This paper describes a local study which has global application.
It is particularly relevant to signatories of the CRPD, who, through
Article 12 of the Convention, have an obligation to promote uni-
versal legal capacity to all citizens, including those with severe
cognitive disability.
Notes
1. United Nations Treaty Collection. “Convention on the Rights




2. In Korp (Guardianship) [2005] VCAT 779, retrieved from
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/vic/VCAT/
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2005/779.html, the proposed represented person was
identified by her surname because of the extensive media
coverage of the situation that led to the proceedings in the
Guardianship List.
3. as stated in the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986,
(Vic) S.22(2).
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